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 Economic Development During Conflict: The Petraeus-Crocker 
Congressional Testimonies 
Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 6 (December 2007) 
by Frank R. Gunter  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Killing insurgents—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat 
an insurgency. Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the 
insurgency’s causes through stability operations as well. This initially involves securing and 
controlling the local population and providing for essential services. As security improves, military 
resources contribute to supporting government reforms and reconstruction projects. 
--U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24, 5, paragraph 1-14. 
Introduction  
In contrast to the December 2006 report of the Iraq Study Group[1] (ISG) economic 
developments in Iraq received significantly more attention in the September 2007 congressional 
testimony of Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker and, to a lesser extent, in that of General David H. 
Petraeus. This greater attention to the essential services and economic development logical lines 
of operation (LLO) is a result of several occurrences.[2]  
Probably most important, the current U.S. military and civilian leadership in Iraq seem to have 
placed a greater emphasis on economic development as a means of both increasing confidence 
in the Government of Iraq (GoI) and reducing tolerance for the insurgency. This is consistent with 
the recent revision of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual which states that restoring essential 
services and accelerating economic development are essential components of successful 
counterinsurgency. The current MNF-I Commander, General Petraeus USA, was one of the co-
authors of this manual, along with Lieutenant General James F. Amos USMC. 
Second, the ISG focus was on diplomatic initiatives and changing the military mission in Iraq to 
achieve a substantial drawdown by the first quarter of 2008.[3] With this focus and timeline, 
economic development was a long-term distraction rather than a short-term priority. The Crocker 
and Petraeus testimonies have a longer term focus. 
Finally, good economic news was in short supply when the ISG was released. In his study 
“Beyond the Iraq Study Group: The Elusive Goal of Sustained Growth,” author Robert Looney 
accurately stated: “…the country’s economic situation is quite dire.”[4] However, during the last 
half year there have been a few signs of economic progress that support Crocker’s statement: 
“The cumulative trajectory of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, 
although the slope is not steep.”[5] 
The sections that follow will attempt to place the Petraeus and Crocker testimonies into the 
context both of current economic events in Iraq as well as the new view of the importance of 
economic development during counterinsurgency.[6] Also, there will be a discussion of several 
important economic events in Iraq that for various reasons were not included in their testimonies.  
What a Difference a Year Makes: Economic Developments in Iraq Since the 
ISG Report  
Despite the insurgency, real economic growth in Iraq continues. In its August 2007 report, the 
IMF estimates that after adjusting for inflation, GDP growth reached 6.2 percent last year 
compared to 3.7 percent in 2005 and 46.5 percent in 2004. Of course, the last figure represents 
the bounce from the 2003 invasion. Because of the usual difficulties in measuring activity in the 
underground or informal economy, the 2006 estimate is probably a lower bound. There is a wide 
divergence in real growth rates among provinces with the Kurdish provinces experiencing the 
highest growth rates. As Ambassador Crocker noted, expected real growth in 2007 will be roughly 
the same as in 2006. [7] While average real growth rates over 6 percent for four successive years 
puts Iraq in the top 10 percent among all nations, neither the GoI nor the coalition is earning 
much praise for this performance. 
One of the many challenges of the economic LLO of counterinsurgency is that not only must 
living standards improve but also the public must be aware that living standards have improved 
and credit the government or the counterinsurgency forces for the improvement. Or as stated in 
the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual: “Counterinsurgency programs for political, social and 
economic well-being are essential to developing the local capacity that commands popular 
support when accurately perceived.”[8] In other words, improved living standards won’t help the 
Iraqi government if either the public is unaware of the improvement or they credit non-
governmental or even anti-governmental organizations for any improvement. 
One reason for the dissatisfaction with the rate of economic growth is that many Iraqis in and out 
of the government compare today’s living standards to those of the oil boom of thirty years ago. 
As can be seen by the figure, while post 2003 real growth has brought the average Iraqi up to the 
per-capita income levels that followed the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, per-capita income is still 
only about one-fifth the level of 1979.[9] Of course, per-capita incomes in 1979 reflected both the 
OPEC oil price boom and an Iraqi population half as large as today.   
Despite the collapse of oil export prices and the tremendously expensive war with Iran, Saddam 
was able to maintain a degree of popular support for his regime by creating an expensive welfare 
state financed by massive foreign borrowing. By 1991, Iraq had become the second most 
indebted country in the world and had almost exhausted possibilities for additional borrowing. 
This supports the Willy Sutton explanation for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.[10]  
Oil has become the curse of Iraq. There is a widespread belief in Iraq that, because of its oil 
wealth, the average Iraqi should have the kind of high income-high leisure existence that is 
associated with residents of Iraq’s Persian Gulf neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. This 
belief feeds into insurgent propaganda that Iraq was prosperous before America and her allies 
came to “steal” Iraqi oil in 1991 and, when the invaders finally depart, Iraq will be prosperous 
again. 
 Unfortunately, the doubling of the Iraqi population combined with the low volumes of oil exports 
render this oil-financed socialist paradise a fantasy. Even assuming that oil prices remain at their 
current high levels, oil exports double from the 1.74 million barrels a day achieved in September 
2007, and no funds are spent on oil-related maintenance and infrastructure, then total oil 
revenues would amount to only $2,300 per person. Added to expected non-oil GDP, the average 
Iraqi will receive an inflation adjusted income that is less than that of the average current resident 
of Lebanon or Jordan. 
However, to the extent that this propaganda of future oil wealth is widely accepted, it creates 
adverse incentives in Iraq. First, almost every Iraqi region, ethnic group, and bureaucratic 
organization seeks to control, or at least achieve secure access to, oil revenues. Each Iraqi entity 
acts as if a failure to win today’s battle over oil revenues will doom their region, ethnic group, or 
bureaucracy for a generation. It becomes a battle that none can afford to lose since it is about 
more than money—it is about power. As Ambassador Crocker noted in his testimony concerning 
the Iraqi debate over sharing oil revenues: “This legislation also has to do with the vision of the 
future Iraqi state.”[11] 
Second, just as the expectation of receiving a large inheritance tends to adversely change the 
behavior of young heirs, the expectation that Iraq will receive large oil revenues adversely 
changed the behavior of both institutions and individuals. The ministerial bureaucracies in 
Baghdad and their associated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) see their role as not providing 
necessary regulation or production but rather providing large scale employment for favored 
regional political, sectarian, or ethnic groups. Many individuals in Iraq prefer government 
employment to entrepreneurship or working for a private firm because employment at oil-financed 
government agencies combine higher incomes with reduced work intensity. And high 2007 oil 
prices have provided ministries with generous funding which has reduced the already weak 
incentives for adopting modern, more efficient, management procedures. 
Through the first nine months of 2007, Iraq’s earnings from petroleum exports benefited both from 
increased volume as well as higher world prices.[12] As a result, Iraq is expected to exceed its 
target for oil export revenues for the second year in a row. This will impact currency reserves, 
inflation, and the value of the Iraqi dinar. 
Iraq is caught in an almost unique dilemma. Over the last three years, the GoI has only been able 
to execute a fraction of its capital infrastructure budget primarily because of inadequate 
managerial capacity and political disputes. In 2006, the GoI spent only 22 percent of the amount 
budgeted for non-provincial capital and reconstruction. For the oil sector, only 3 percent was 
spent.[13] Despite this under-spending, rigidities in the Iraqi economy, shortages of skilled labor 
as well as wide-spread mismanagement and corruption mean that much of the spending that did 
occur resulted only in higher prices for existing products and assets—not increased output. Rapid 
money growth combined with much slower increase in the production of goods and services led 
to the current estimated 2007 year-to-date consumer inflation rate of 41 percent—roughly the 
same pace of price increases as the 65 percent inflation of 2006. 
Normally, a domestic inflation rate greater than that of one’s trading and investment partners 
results in a depreciation of a nation’s currency, but not in Iraq. Instead, the Iraqi dinar has 
appreciated by 17 percent![14] Therefore, not only do Iraqi businesses and consumers struggle to 
deal with rapid inflation but also non-petroleum exports face a loss in competitiveness from 
exchange rate appreciation—a case of the Dutch Disease.[15]   
The inability to actually spend the budgeted amounts combined with high crude oil prices over the 
last eighteen months have resulted in large accumulations of dollars in the GoI account at the 
New York Federal Reserve. By mid-July 2007, these holdings had reached an estimated $21 
billion.[16] By the rule of thumb that a nation ought to keep reserves equal to three months 
imports, Iraq has approximately $14 billion in “excess” currency reserves. In addition, the GoI 
ended up with a fiscal surplus of 12 percent in 2006, approximately the same scale as in 2005. As 
a result, the Development Fund of Iraq reached $8.6 billion at the end of 2006.[17] 
Since Iraq has great need for infrastructure investment in essential services and energy, one 
would think that these excess reserves should be rapidly spent. In his testimony, Crocker stated 
that the GoI is already spending its $10 billion 2007 capital budget at about twice the rate of last 
year.[18] The expectation that this rate of spending will continue through the rest of the year may 
be overly optimistic. The experience of 2006 shows that the managerial capacity of both the 
Baghdad ministries and provincial governments is only slowly improving from a very low level. 
The 2007 budget of $10 billion of spending in one year will probably exceed the capacity of the 
government authorities in both Baghdad and the provinces. As a result, it is unlikely that either 
the Baghdad ministries or the provinces will spend most of their 2007 capital budgets, and some 
of the funds that are spent will be wasted through general inefficiency, security issues, shortages 
of skilled labor, and corruption.  
In other words, unless there is a sharp drop in oil prices, the binding constraint on effective capital 
investment in Iraq, including the critical oil industry, is not a shortage of funds but rather 
insufficient managerial capacity at both the national and provincial level. While Iraq may not need 
any additional investment capital, it desperately needs the knowledge of navigating a transitional 
economy that could be provided by the World Bank and other international organizations as well 
as the managerial skills that accompany foreign private investment. 
But all attempts to restore the infrastructure and accelerate economic development will be wasted 
unless corruption, the abuse of public power for private benefit, can be controlled. [19] While 
Petraeus stated that competition for power and resources is the fundamental source of conflict in 
Iraq, he includes various forms of corruption, along with lack of capacity and sectarian mistrust, 
as adding to Iraq’s challenges.[20] 
The Political Economy of Corruption in Modern Iraq  
Iraq is not the most corrupt country on Earth, North Korea is probably the holder of that dubious 
honor. But according to the 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Iraq is 
in second to last place of the 180 countries for which reliable corruption surveys were 
available.[21] 
As stories of Iraqi corruption proliferate in the media, including a leaked U.S. Embassy corruption 
study, there is a greater awareness of the scale of corruption in that country. Corruption ranges 
from senior government bureaucrats in Baghdad accepting bribes of hundreds of millions of 
dollars to buy defective military equipment to flour agents in poor southern villages selling bushels 
of wheat intended as charity for poor families. While Iraq has a generation-long history of large 
scale corruption, it has worsened since the 2003 invasion by the U.S.-led coalition. While 
corruption under Saddam was severe, it was also organized and, to an extent, predictable. Since 
Saddam’s fall, corruption has become entrepreneurial, resulting in a sharp increase in corruption-
related uncertainty.[22] It has reached the point where corruption is so pervasive that it may be a 
greater threat to the future of Iraq than the insurgency. Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction refers to corruption as Iraq’s “second insurgency.” 
Less attention in the media has been paid to the question: “Why is Iraq so corrupt?” Researchers 
have identified some environmental or cultural characteristics that tend to be associated with 
higher levels of corruption and Iraq possesses many of them. Countries tend to show higher 
levels of corruption if they have an inhospitable climate, French or socialist legal system, Catholic 
or Muslim religion, high rates of cousin marriage, and corrupt neighbors.[23] All of these 
characteristics describe Iraq and little can be done about changing them. 
There is also a symbiotic relationship between corruption and the insurgency. Corruption is good 
for the insurgency. Corrupt activities, including official theft, extortion and “ghost workers,” provide 
funding for the insurgency. Organizations and ratlines that handle smuggled or stolen goods 
provide routes and safe houses for insurgents, IED makings, and provide part of the logistics tail 
for the insurgency. Finally, corruption undermines public confidence in both the GoI and the 
Coalition. And the insurgency is good for corruption. The reality of terrorist attacks justifies 
bypassing procedures and provides a ready excuse for corruption related losses. Fighting the 
insurgency increases the urgency of getting things done regardless of the cost, which facilitates 
bribes and extortion. 
It is too early to know whether the symbiotic relationship cuts both ways. Will the recent decrease 
in insurgent violence lead to a reduction in corruption? 
TheGoI has made limited efforts to fight corruption through better governance and attempts to 
prosecute the corrupt. These efforts have been undermined by the willingness of the various 
ministers, including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, to block corruption investigations using Article 
136B of the Criminal code. This Saddam era article, that was suspended under the CPA and then 
later restored, requires investigators to get the permission of the minister of an agency before it 
can take any case involving that agency to court. Judge Rahdi Hamza al-Radhi, who has the well 
deserved reputation of being both brave and honest, testified that the use of Art. 136B as well as 
repeated threats and acts of violence against corruption investigators have stalled most high-level 
anti-corruption investigations.[24] 
While al-Rahdi’s and other recent reports emphasize failures to successfully investigate and 
prosecute corruption, some progress has been made in reducing the economic incentives for 
corruption as well as mobilizing public anger at the corrupt. 
Under pressure from the IMF, Saddam-era fuel subsidies have been sharply reduced and in 
some cases eliminated. Previously these subsidies not only ensured huge gains to those who 
had the influence to divert fuel supplies into the black market but also necessitated massive 
government financed fuel imports. A diversion of a single tanker truck load of fuel into the black 
market could result in $6,000 to $7,000 profit for the smuggler. Refinery constraints, smuggling, 
and excessive consumption of almost free fuels led to large scale fuel imports. For example, 
during one week in September 2005, Iraq imported at market prices and then distributed at large 
discounts about two-thirds of its diesel and gasoline needs.[25] 
Over eighteen months, as a result of the subsidy reductions, fuel prices increased dramatically. 
For example, regular gasoline which sold for 5 cents a gallon in September 2005 had risen to 
$1.05 a gallon by June 2007.[26] Gasoline prices and other fuel prices are now roughly in line 
with those of Iraq’s neighbors, which has reduced the incentives for fuel smuggling and the 
associated bribes. Progress in eliminating other major subsidies, such as electricity, water and 
food, is much slower. 
NID per liter  September 2005  December 2006  June 2007  
LPG (12kg)  250  1,000  3,000  
Regular Gas  20  250  350  
Premium Gas  50  350  Market Price  
Blended Gas  N/A  350  450  
Kerosene  5  75  200  
Diesel  10  150  350  
Of course, the reduction in subsidies by itself will not eliminate corruption in Iraq. Smugglers and 
others continue to adapt to the changing economic environment. But the fuel subsidy reduction 
disrupted old ways of doing (illegal) business, reduced insurgent finances, and changed the 
incentives towards corruption in many related markets. Corruption continues but now it is harder 
to earn a dishonest dollar. 
The sharp reduction in fuel subsidies was not only directly advantageous to the Iraqi economy but 
also may have changed beliefs about what is now politically possible in Iraq. The fuel subsidy 
reductions and the accompanying increase in the prices paid by the average consumer were very 
unpopular politically—leading to widespread protests and a few riots. It was widely believed that 
the new GoI would take counsel of its fears and stop or even reverse fuel price increases. 
However, despite the political fallout, the Government successfully completed the fuel 
liberalization program. Possibly the dramatic increase in fuel prices is unique because the IMF 
made it clear that progress in negotiations to reduce Iraq’s huge post-war foreign debt depended 
on the GoI demonstrating that it could eliminate or at least sharply reduce subsides. A more 
optimistic view is that the GoI is gradually becoming more confident that it can successfully defy 
violent street protests if it can convince most of the public that changes are needed. 
The extensive coverage and criticism of government successes and missteps illustrates another 
favorable trend in gradually reducing the prevalence of corruption in Iraq, the growth of a vibrant 
non-governmental media.  
Under Saddam, all media was a state monopoly and coverage of government corruption was 
non-existent. In contrast, Iraqis are now able to choose from fifty-four commercial TV stations 
(compared to zero in the pre-war period), 114 commercial radio stations (compared to zero pre-
war) and an estimated 268 independent newspapers and magazines (also zero).[27] While many 
of these outlets are associated with various parties or sectarian groups; stories, editorials and 
biting cartoons against corruption are a common denominator. And surveys show that the 
average Iraqi has greater trust in the media than in political parties, the legislature, or even the 
judiciary. Studies of successful anti-corruption efforts reveal the importance of a free press in 
changing the culture of corruption.[28] While reducing incentives for corruption and marshalling 
the power of a free press have weakened the corruption culture in Iraq, further progress will 
require improved governance as well as more effective anti-corruption law enforcement. 
Of course, an anti-corruption campaign is only part of the economic component of successful 
counterinsurgency. What other expensive and bloody lessons has Iraq provided in the economics 
of counterinsurgency? 
The Economic LLOs and Counterinsurgency 
According to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the economic components of 
counterinsurgency can be divided into restoring essential services and economic development. 
Essential services include police, fire protection, water, electricity, schools, transportation 
networks, medical availability, sanitation, food supply, fuels, and basic financial services.[29] 
Economic development is not directly defined in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, but from 
the context in which it is used. Economic development activities are those that will lead to a 
robust improvement in the population’s living standards. Examples of these activities are job 
creation, local investment, clarifying property ownership and conflict resolution, protecting 
property rights, market creation, and vocational training.[30] 
One critical difference between efforts to restore essential services and achieve economic 
development is sequencing. According to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, restoration of 
essential services must begin immediately regardless of the security situation in the country. In 
fact, restoration of essential services is stated to be a key component of any successful 
counterinsurgency operation. On the other hand, economic development must often wait until 
security is essentially restored. This dichotomy is noticeable in the treatments of economic 
development in the testimonies of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Except for the 
single reference to corruption noted above, Petraeus is silent on economic development while 
Crocker devotes a section to this subject.[31] Possibly this reflects the General’s focus on the five 
provinces where most of the violence is occurring while the Ambassador pays more attention to 
events in the other fourteen provinces including the six with little or no violence. 
What lessons can we glean from the Iraqi experience concerning the roles of essential services 
and economic development in a successful counterinsurgency? There is a widely held belief 
among military thinkers that while soldiers, weapons, and tactics may change dramatically, there 
are basic rules of combat that are as true now as in the days of Sun Tzu or Caesar. Two of these 
old chestnuts describe some of the important lessons of the economic LLO in Iraq. First, in 
combat it is important to look unimportant. Second, battles almost invariably take place at a time 
or location that maximizes the difficulty of coordinating action. 
Try to Look Unimportant—the Enemy May Be Low on Ammunition 
While providing essential services using a complex interdependent system may be most efficient 
during periods of civil order, during an active insurgency such a system is extremely vulnerable to 
both insurgent activity and intra-provincial/sectarian/ethnic disputes. During an insurgency one is 
usually better off pursuing simpler redundant systems for providing essential services that are 
less efficient but more robust. The continuing struggle to bring reliable electricity to the people of 
Iraq exemplifies this maxim 
Despite three years' expenditure of massive amounts of blood and treasure, Ambassador 
Crocker acknowledged that the electricity supply in Baghdad is still “woefully inadequate.”[32] 
Nationwide, it was only in September 2007 that the average amount of electricity generated in 
Iraq exceeded August 2004 levels (4,975 megawatts).[33] The primary reason for the lack of 
progress is insurgent activity. The electricity grid with its complex system of generating plants, 
step-up transformers, high voltage transmission lines, substations with step-down transformers, 
low voltage transmission lines, and connections to individual businesses or homes is an 
insurgent’s dream. This long chain of carefully coordinated activities is clearly visible, cannot be 
protected everywhere and a break anywhere in the chain usually leads to a cascading national 
power failure. If one of the goals of the insurgency is to undermine the confidence of the Iraqi 
people in the capability of the GoI then attacks on the electrical grid provide a high payoff in 
public chaos at low cost and low risk to the insurgency. 
An alternative approach is to accept that the national electrical grid cannot be consistently 
operated until the insurgency has been degraded to where it is just a problem for the police rather 
than a threat to national sovereignty. The alternative with the least vulnerability is distributed 
generation (also called onsite distribution) where electricity is produced using smaller, often 
mobile, generators on multiple grids that may supply power to only a single factory, office, or 
residential district. Electricity from distributed generation is much more expensive than that from a 
nationwide grid but it is much less vulnerable to insurgent activities. And if the fuel for the small 
generators is delivered by trucks with their inherent flexibility of routes and timing then the 
vulnerability of a nationwide power loss is lessened even further. Anyone who flies over Baghdad 
when the national electric grid is down sees the proof that the private sector has adopted 
distributed generation. The city is a sea of lights powered by a redundant unconnected maze of 
private generators with fuel provided by fleets of trucks. 
To an extent, this choosing of multiple redundant—hopefully more robust—suppliers over a 
theoretically more efficient integrated solution is increasingly reflected in overall coalition strategy 
in Iraq. There is greater willingness to bypass Baghdad—less emphasis on a “made in Baghdad” 
nationwide solutions—not only with respect to economic initiatives but also to political programs 
as well. And more reliance on efforts at the provincial and local level to restore essential services 
and facilitate economic development. Although Ambassador Crocker notes that provinces lack 
the ability to generate funds through taxation,[34] there is an increasing effort to allocate funds, 
$3 billion in 2007, directly to the provinces and the Kurdish regions for spending. While the 
provinces have similar problems to the Baghdad ministries with respect to managerial capacity 
and corruption, it is believed that provincial authorities are both more responsive to their 
populations and more open to advice from NGOs and the U.S. government provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRT) than the Baghdad ministries. But this shift to a provincial focus will 
increase the difficulty of coordinating the economic LLO. 
Battles Always Occur at the Intersection of Two or More Maps 
While the Counterinsurgency Field Manual distinguishes between restoring essential services, 
which should occur simultaneously with security operations, and economic development, which 
should follow such operations—the reality on the ground often makes it difficult to tell which side 
of the line one is on. Six provinces have experienced relatively low levels of violence against 
either Iraqi police or civilians (Dahul, Irbil, Sulaimaniya, Qadisiya, Misan and Muthanna) and 
therefore should definitely be engaged in economic development. On the other hand, another five 
provinces have relatively high levels of violence (Ninevah, Baghdad, Babil, Anbar and Basra)[35] 
and, according to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, it would be premature to aggressively 
pursue economic development in these provinces. But whether and to what degree to pursue 
economic development in any except the most peaceful provinces is a difficult judgment call. If 
economic development projects begin too soon then disrupting them may just provide more 
trophy scalps and accompanying propaganda victories for the insurgency. On the other hand, 
delay economic development too long and one misses the opportunity to undermine the 
insurgency by more rapidly building public support for the government. 
The most dramatic example of this judgment call is when a commander must choose between a 
short-term gain in security and long-term mission success. This is the subject of several of the 
“Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations” discussed in the Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual.[36]   
One current dispute over whether the focus should be on the short-term or the long-term has led 
to dueling policy recommendations by the Departments of State and Defense. This is the Bremer-
Brinkley state-owned enterprises (SOE) controversy.[37] Paul Bremer advocated the liquidation 
or privatization of SOE, a view that is supported by the U.S. Department of State in Iraq. Paul 
Brinkley with the support of the Department of Defense, believes that SOE should be reopened 
both to provide goods and services as well as jobs. 
Since the formal or legal private sector is relatively small in Iraq, estimates of unemployment 
range up to 60 percent. However, these estimates generally ignore employment in the large and 
growing informal or gray market sector of Iraq. When employment in the informal sector is 
included, surveys point to a national unemployment rate of 18 to 22 percent which is excessive by 
OECD standards but roughly equivalent to unemployment rates in other Middle Eastern countries 
and the transitional countries of Eastern Europe.[38] So Iraq faces two problems. In the short-
term, employment must be found for the currently unemployed—mostly unskilled labor. But in the 
long-term, jobs must be found in the future for the almost 40 percent of Iraq’s population that is 
less than 15 years old. 
One difficulty in growing non-government jobs for Iraqis is the opposition of the ubiquitous and yet 
grossly inefficient Iraqi government bureaucracy. The bureaucratic complexity required to legally 
run a private business combined with the vulnerability of firms in the formal economy to demands 
for bribes from government officials and extortion demands from various insurgent groups provide 
strong incentives for firms to “hide” in the informal economy.[39] Below is a comparison of Iraq, 
other countries in the Middle East and the OECD countries of some of the costs of legally doing 
business.[40] Starting a business refers to the administrative requirements to incorporate an 
entity. The rigidity of hours index refers to restrictions on weekend and night work, requirements 
relating to working time and mandated annual paid leave. Export delay includes the time required 
to obtain the necessary government approval and inspections for an export. Finally, since there is 
no record of any Iraqi firm going legally bankrupt since 2003, there is no way to judge how long 
the process might take.  
  Iraq ME Region  OECD  
Start a business 77 days  39 days  15 days  
Rigidity of hours 60  42  39  
Export delay 102 days  25 days  10 days  
Bankruptcy None  3.7 years  1.3 years  
Not only does the bureaucracy impose severe time delays on establishing a business but, 
disregarding bribes, it is expensive. The World Bank estimates that it will cost almost 94 percent 
of the average Iraqi’s income to establish a firm. One of the most depressing entries in this table 
is that it takes at least 102 days (and $3,400!) to legally export a non-petroleum product from Iraq 
compared to less than a month (and less than $1,500) for its Middle East neighbors.[41] Iraqi 
exporters face these hurdles in addition to the sharp appreciation of the dinar. The barriers to 
establishing a legal business mean that as much as 25 percent of GDP and maybe as much as 
half of employment is in the informal economy. 
Further complicating the unemployment challenge is Iraq’s dependency on a single natural 
resource that provides relatively low levels of employment. While petroleum accounts for over 90 
percent of government revenues and almost 66 percent of GDP, it only provides 2 percent of the 
jobs in Iraq. Saddam, a believer in the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party agenda, developed a system of 
SOEs to provide almost 600,000 jobs for his supporters. Like such firms elsewhere, Iraq’s 
approximately 200 SOEs tend to be low-quality, high-cost producers with little chance for 
expansion without significant subsidies. 
The long-term solution is to attempt to restore the vibrant and relatively efficient private sector 
economy that existed before the Ba'athist Party solidified its control in the mid-1970s. Because 
the SOE imposed inefficiencies on other firms, required huge subsidies and tended to hoard labor 
and resources, it was believed that the revival of a private economy in Iraq would require the 
dismantling of the SOE. And in fact, the Development Strategy of the Government of Iraq, based 
on the advice of former U.S. occupation administrator Paul Bremer and the IMF, called for the 
liquidation of SOE empty shells and the privatization of the rest with the possible exception of 
certain strategic industries.[42] This policy was generally opposed by the Baghdad ministries and 
as a result of ministerial delaying tactics, mismanagement, and corruption, none of the SOEs has 
yet been liquidated or privatized. 
The lack of progress in reviving the market economy led U.S. commanders in Iraq to advocate a 
short-term solution of quickly reopening SOEs. These commanders believe that poor, 
unemployed young men were joining the insurgency both as a way of gaining status among their 
peers and as a source of spending money. If reopening the SOEs can provide these young men 
with incomes and status then their support for the insurgency will lessen—saving the lives of the 
coalition and Iraqi security forces. The commanders are well aware of the corruption and waste 
associated with the SOEs but their focus is on reducing the level of violence.[43]  
Under the lead of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Paul Brinkley, an effort to reopen some of 
the SOEs has begun. The targeted firms formerly produced medical supplies, flour, ceramics, 
carpets, textiles and buses. It has been difficult both to raise financing and interest investors as 
well as to persuade other firms to purchase SOE products. As a result, progress has been slow 
during the first year of this program with fewer than twenty factories reopened, creating 
approximately 5,000 jobs.[44] 
Who is right in the Bremer-Brinkley state-owned enterprise (SOE) controversy? Brinkley is right 
that in the short-term rapidly providing jobs should reduce support for the insurgency. But this 
favorable impact requires that the jobs be forthcoming in a reasonable period of time. Despite 
many optimistic announcements, few new SOE jobs have been created in the first year of the 
program. Bremer is right that in the long-term a vibrant free market is more likely to provide 
enough jobs in the future for the large number of young Iraqis. But efforts to liquidate or privatize 
SOEs have stalled and, especially since the 2005 elections, the United States' ability to pressure 
the GoI into liquidation or privatization has decreased. The difficulty of coordinating economic 
development disputes such as the SOE debate reflect, in part, differences in organizational 
commitment to counterinsurgency in Iraq between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. 
The most obvious sign of the differences of commitment are the policies towards manning. To the 
Department of Defense (DoD), filling positions in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is the priority and orders 
to a war zone are difficult to refuse. Not only are most positions filled most of the time with an 
appropriately trained soldier, sailor, aviator or Marine; an expensive effort is made to ensure that 
these individuals don’t depart the war zone until after their successors arrive in order to have a 
smooth transition. 
The Department of State (DoS) and other U.S. agencies followed a different policy. Until 
November 2007, DoS personnel could refuse assignment to Iraq, tended to stay for shorter 
periods of time, and often left before their successors arrived. As a result, there was a continuing 
gap in the middle among non-military personnel in Iraq. 
The heads of each Embassy section are first rate and some are the top experts in their field. And 
each section has some young people on one of their first assignments ,but there is usually a 
shortage of mid-career DoS personnel. This gap in the middle made for unnecessary frustration 
in coordination between military and civilian personnel on restoring essential services and 
economic development. Embassy section heads tended to have overflowing inboxes since they 
often had no experienced personnel to whom to delegate decisions. And if a critical Embassy 
section was temporarily without a head then decisions are delayed until he or she can be 
replaced, kicked upstairs to a more senior Embassy official, or made without effective Embassy 
input. 
The shortage of DoS staff degraded the effort to rapidly establish effective Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Among other priorities, the mission of the twenty-five PRTs is to 
help the provincial governments with economic development and meeting the basic needs of the 
provincial population. As Crocker stated in his testimony, these PRTs have a critical role in 
helping the Iraqi authorities rebuild communities when the shooting stops. Among the programs 
that PRTs are attempting to establish across Iraq are vocational training for the unskilled and 
microfinance to support the private economic sector.[45] 
However, because of the inability of the DoS and other non-military U.S. departments to provide 
all of the qualified personnel required, the establishment of particular PRT were delayed or 
rendered less effective. Often military personnel with limited knowledge about providing essential 
services or facilitating economic development were assigned these responsibilities. Possibly 
more worrisome, the shortage of DoS personnel combined with DoS restrictions on travel inside 
Iraq gave some PRTs a “military face” that contradicted efforts to grow Iraqi civilian capabilities. 
Fortunately, this situation has recently changed. Beginning on November 12, 2007, in the largest 
call-up of U.S. diplomats since the Vietnam War, the DoS began to assign people to Iraq. 
Supposedly, failure to accept such an assignment may result in sanctions including dismissal 
from the Foreign Service.[46] This should alleviate the problem of divergent manning policies 
between DoD and DoS. 
What Should be Done?  
The challenge is how to accelerate economic development in Iraq not only as part of the 
counterinsurgency effort but also to increase the living standards of the average Iraqi. Based on 
realities on the ground in Iraq as well as the increasing consensus of what is required for a 
successful counterinsurgency, there are several policies that should become priorities. 
Pervasive corruption is the most serious roadblock to achieving stability, economic development 
and a democratic future in Iraq. Regardless of the blood and treasure expended, failure to reduce 
corruption to tolerable levels will doom efforts to build a new Iraq.   
At the individual level, corrupt acts are inequitable. They allow some to avoid laws, regulations 
and practices that others must follow. Thus, corruption undermines the average Iraqi’s confidence 
that success results from individual effort, rather than from bribery or political connections. 
Further exacerbating the impact of corruption in Iraq is the symbiotic relationship between 
corruption and the insurgency. In addition, there is a growing body of research that corruption 
tends to have an adverse impact on a country’s economy. 
Some commentators argue that, like sand after a desert storm, corruption permeates every 
corner of Iraqi society because it is part of the national culture. Therefore, the argument continues, 
efforts to eradicate corruption are doomed, and it is better to just learn to live with it. Eradication 
of corruption is impossible—no nation has ever achieved this goal. But the level and damage 
done by corruption is not static. In the absence of an aggressive anti-corruption effort, corruption 
in Iraq will steadily worsen. It would be ironic if so many coalition military and Iraqi people died to 
create a more perfect kleptocracy. 
Experience in other countries transitioning from socialism to markets has shown that successful 
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of the worst offenders is necessary but not sufficient to 
substantially reduce corruption. Successful anti-corruption efforts require a coordinated effort 
incorporating better governance, reducing perverse economic incentives, increased rule of law, a 
free press exposing the culture of corruption, and an aroused citizenry that is unwilling to accept 
the corruption status quo. In fact, Iraq has two advantages in its fight against corruption that many 
nations at similar levels of development lack: Literacy levels are relatively high and, within the 
memory of the older members of the community, Iraq was a relatively honest nation—widespread 
corruption seems to be a product of the last 35 years. 
Complex interdependent national systems for providing essential services and establishing a 
framework for economic development during an insurgency are extremely vulnerable to both 
insurgent activity and intra- and international political disputes. Essential services and economic 
development should generally be provided using simpler redundant systems crafted to fit local 
conditions. These local solutions can be expected to be less efficient but more robust.  
One joke that economists tell is that no economic statement that you make about Iraq can ever 
be completely wrong—whatever economic claim you make is true somewhere in Iraq and false 
somewhere else. Like many jokes, this one reflects part of reality. Success on the economic 
LLOs requires a keen awareness of local conditions along with flexibility of implementation. 
The twenty-five PRTs provide this awareness. And the decision to provide PRT leaders with their 
own pot of funds to leverage the rebuilding of institutions after the shooting stops (or at least 
slows) should allow the needed flexibility.[47] High oil prices combined with daily oil exports 
recently exceeding 1.7 million barrels a day mean that current Iraq reconstruction and economic 
development efforts are no longer constrained by a shortage of funds. However, limited 
management capacities at the provincial and local levels of government make it very difficult to 
spend on restoring essential services or facilitating economic development without excessive 
corruption and waste. 
Of course, for the PRTs to provide credible advice and guidance based on an accurate 
knowledge of local conditions requires not only that PRT positions are filled with qualified people 
but also that security requirements are flexible enough to allow PRT personnel daily contact with 
their Iraqi counterparts. While the DoS’s recent decision to direct personnel to Iraq assignments 
will probably take care of the first requirement, solving the second problem, establishing a 
security protocol that will allow regular contact with Iraqi counterparts, is likely to be more difficult. 
This difficulty is exacerbated in view of the controversy surrounding Blackwater USA, one of the 
three largest DoS security contractors in Iraq. 
But in the long-run, success in the economic LLOs is primarily dependent upon continuing 
improvement in the security environment. If security continues to improve then the argument over 
the best way to provide essential services and economic development will continue. But if 
security deteriorates then even the best crafted economic policy will fail. Whether security 
progress will continue is the great unknown. As General Petraeus stated: “In fact, our experience 
in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be 
misleading and even hazardous.”[48] 
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